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ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL. 
The City's assertion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal is 
categorically without merit. This Court has already ruled that it has subject matter 
jurisdiction over this appeal, and rejected the very argument which the City again asserts 
when this Court denied the City's motion for summary disposition. [12/29/05 Order 
(attached as Exhibit A).] The Court's ruling is squarely supported by the governing Utah 
authority, and the City's re-argument to the contrary does nothing to change this result. 
This Court, as it already expressly ruled, has jurisdiction over this appeal because 
the district court ruled on the constitutionality of the Ordinance as applied to Mr. Orvis. 
[12/29/05 Order (holding this Court has jurisdiction because Mr. Orvis "is appealing the 
constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to him") (emphasis added).] In cases where 
an appeal is brought from the justice court to the district court for a trial de novo, the 
district court's decision may be appealed if "the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.v Utah Code. Ann. § 78-5-120(7) (2004) 
(emphasis added). An appellate court has jurisdiction to hear such an appeal if the district 
court ruled on the constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to the defendant. South 
Salt Lake City v. Terkelson. 2002 UT App. 405, fflf 6-7, 61 P.3d 282, 284. Terkelson is 
1 
directly on point, is the governing law, and is dispositive of this issue.1 
The City's attempt to re-argue the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in its Brief 
improperly attempts to circumvent the procedures required for the Court to reconsider its 
previous ruling.2 The appropriate method for challenging an appellate court's previous 
determination relative to whether it has jurisdiction is by filing a petition for rehearing. 
Utah R. App. P. 35; see also Larsen v. Larsen, 674 P.2d 116, 116 (Utah 1983) 
(reconsidering the court's prior determination relative to jurisdiction after granting 
appellant's petition for rehearing). A court will not grant a rehearing of "points of law or 
fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended" in the 
absence of a petition for rehearing, and a petition for rehearing must be filed "within 14 
days after the entry of the decision of the court." Utah R. App. P. 35(a). 
This Court denied the City's motion for summary disposition and determined that 
it had subject matter jurisdiction in its Order dated December 29, 2005. If the City 
wished for the Court to reconsider its determination, the City was required to file a 
petition for rehearing by January 12, 2006. Having not done so, the City's renewed 
attempt to have the Court reconsider its decision should be rejected, and this Court's prior 
*For an in-depth treatment of Terkelson and its application to this case, Mr. Orvis 
directs the Court's attention to Mr. Orvis's opposition to the City's motion for summary 
disposition, which was filed with the Court on December 16, 2005. 
2Mr. Orvis requested costs and attorney's fees in opposing the City's motion for 
summary disposition, which request was denied. [12/29/05 Order.] The City's 
inappropriate attempt to re-assert its jurisdictional argument in its briefing for plenary 
presentation of this case may warrant an award of costs and fees. Utah R. App. P. 33. 
2 
ruling should be treated as law of the case. Cf Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that motions to 
reconsider are disfavored and, "[o]nce the judge has decided, the system assumes he or 
she has decided correctly and would decide the same way again").3 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the City's re-argument, the City 
wholly fails to provide a basis on which to vacate the Court's previous ruling. 
1. The City's argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
because Mr. Orvis allegedly did not raise the constitutionality of the Ordinance in the 
justice court is without merit because the issue was raised in the district court. The City 
flatly misstates the law by asserting the constitutionality of an ordinance must be raised in 
the justice court. The City's reliance on State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), is wholly misplaced because Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 has since been twice 
amended and repealed as the result of a clear legislative effort to debunk the very notion 
the City now asserts. Section 78-5-120, as amended, governs this appeal. 
In 1997, the Utah State Legislature amended section 78-5-120 to "suggest[] a party 
3Moreover, the City misconstrues the rule that "subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time." Fisher v. Fisher. 2003 UT App 91, TJ155 67 P.3d 1055, 1058. This 
concept is based largely on the principle that the defense of lack of "subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, Tj 34, 100 P.3d 1177, 1186; 
accord Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). Certainly, a party may not be deprived, by waiver or 
otherwise, of its right to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on 
appeal. However, this does not, as the City seems to assert, translate into the right to 
repeatedly and continuously raise the issue after this Court has already determined it does 
have subject matter jurisdiction. 
3 
could raise the issue in the district court in the de novo proceedings/'4 Hinson, 966 P.2d 
at 275 n.2. In 2001, the Utah State Legislature repealed and reenacted section 78-5-120 
in order to "clarif[y] the circumstances under which a person or the prosecutor may 
appeal/' S.B. 128, 54th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2001 Utah Laws 7. As part of its clarification, 
the legislature replaced section 78-5-120fs previous wording, "unless the court rules on 
the constitutionality," with "unless the district court rules on the constitutionality/'5 IcL 
This change clearly demonstrates the Legislature's intent that the decision of the district 
court may be appealed if the district court rules on the constitutionality of an ordinance.6 
4Section 78-5-120 never explicitly stated that it was the justice court that had to 
rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. In fact, even the 1997 Amendment 
merely stated that the court must rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
H.B. 323, 52nd Leg., Gen. Sess., 1997 Utah Laws 215, § 17. Therefore, it is no surprise 
that, a short time later, the legislature again amended the section to correct this ambiguity. 
5The City's reliance on Hinson is further misplaced because the Hinson court 
based its decision on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(12)(a)'s statement that the 
"decision of the district court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court.'*' Hinson, 966 P.2d at 275-76. The City 
fails to mention that "Former Rule 26, relating to appeals in criminal cases, was repealed 
effective April 1,1999." Utah R. Crim. P. 26, historical notes (emphasis added). The 
current provisions in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to justice courts, 
including Rule 38, make no mention of any such requirement. Rule 38 merely provides 
that "[ajppeal of a judgment or order of the justice court is as provided in Utah Code 
Section 78-5-120/' Utah R. Crim. P. 38. 
6Moreover, it would be an unworkable rule to require a party to raise an issue in 
the justice court in order to appeal a district court's de novo decision. Justice courts are 
not courts of record. Hinson, 966 P.2d at 275; Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 1-101(1)(J). 
Absent a judicial record, it would be virtually impossible for a party to conclusively 
establish whether or not they had raised a particular issue in the justice court, thereby 
possibly denying them their lawful right to appeal. 
4 
2. Contrary to the City^s argument Mr, Orvis's claim for selective enforcement 
is unquestionably an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of the Ordinance. In 
simple terms, Mr. Orvis claims the City's application of the Ordinance violated his equal 
protection rights because the City selectively enforced the Ordinance against him in a 
discriminatory manner. A review of even the most basic authorities confirms that an "as 
applied" challenge is "[a] lawsuit claiming that a law or governmental policy, though 
constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, [usually] because of a 
discriminatory effect." Black's Law Dictionary 180 (7th ed. 2000); see also Ocean Park 
Assoc/s v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1062 (2004) (noting 
an "as applied" challenge seeks "relief from a specific application of a facially valid 
statute or ordinance to an individual... as a result of the manner or circumstances in 
which the statute or ordinance has been applied." (internal quotations omitted)). This is 
exactly what Mr. Orvis has claimed. [12/29/05 Order.] 
The City's attempt to distinguish Terkelson from the current case is unconvincing. 
The defendants in Terkelson appealed their conviction, arguing "their due process rights 
were violated when the City altered its interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance 
without notice." 2002 UT App 405, fflj 3-4, 7, 61 P.3d 282 (emphasis added). In 
response, this Court specifically held the defendants' claim was an "as applied" challenge 
to the constitutionality of the ordinance and was therefore sufficient to vest this Court 
5 
with jurisdiction.7 Id. 
Just like Terkelson. Mr. Orvis has presented this Court with an "as applied" 
challenge to an ordinance. Like Terkelson. Mr. Orvis is challenging the City's 
enforcement of an ordinance. Although Mr. Orvis"s claim involves the constitutional 
right to equal protection instead of due process, both claims are premised upon a City's 
unlawful enforcement of an ordinance. Try as the City might to distance itself from 
Terkelson, the claims in these two cases are parallel. 
Finally, the City' reliance on Saniour v. E.P.A.. 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995), for 
the proposition that Mr. Orvis"s claim is not an "as applied" challenge, is wholly 
misplaced. The Sanjour court did not determine or even address whether selective 
enforcement claims are "as applied" challenges to the validity of an ordinance. Instead, 
the Sanjour court simply rejected the notion that a plaintiff can proceed on an "as 
applied" First Amendment claim8 vis-a-vis a selective enforcement claim.9 Id at 91-92. 
7The City's attempt to distinguish Terkelson because "the defendants in Terkelson 
claimed that the ordinance was void for vagueness or for over-breath," [Appellee Br. at 
14], is without merit. The Terkelson court never addressed that claim, and only 
referenced it in passing. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405, *f 5 n.4. The Terkelson court 
decided the case based solely on "Defendants' due process argument." kL 
8As the Sanjour court notes, the term "'as applied' [is] a term of art in First 
Amendment law," and the analysis of whether a claimant has sufficiently demonstrated an 
enforcing officiafs desire to prevent free speech for purposes of a selective enforcement 
claim is not the same analysis of whether a claimant has sufficiently demonstrated a First 
Amendment "as applied" challenge. Id at 92 n.9. 
9In Sanjour. the plaintiffs challenged an ethics regulation prohibiting employees of 
the EPA from being reimbursed for unauthorized speaking engagements. LI at 89. The 
6 
II. THE CITY ESSENTIALLY CONCEDES THAT THIS COURT SHOULD 
APPLY A LESS DEFERENTIAL STANDARD WHEN REVIEWING THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS CASE. 
Mr. Orvis conclusively established that the district court's findings are clearly 
erroneous in several material respects. [Opening Br. at 30-34, 39-44.] Consequently, this 
Court should reverse Mr. Orvis's conviction even assuming, arguendo, that the "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review applies. 
Nonetheless, it is appropriate for this Court to apply a less deferential standard of 
review, rather than the clearly erroneous standard, for two separate and independant 
reasons. First, the district court mechanically adopted the City's partisan findings 
verbatim. [Opening Br. at 44-47.] Second, the findings fail to disclose the steps by 
which the district court reached its decision. [Id. at 47-48.] Accordingly, the Court 
should perform a more critical review of the factual findings (taking into account the 
district court's lack of personal attention to the findings), and should only require Mr. 
Orvis to demonstrate that a finding is against the weight of the evidence. [IdL at 48.] 
The City wholly failed to address Mr. Orvis's primary standard of review 
argument - that the Court should apply a less deferential standard, rather than a clearly 
plaintiffs challenged the rule, inter alia, on First Amendment and selective 
enforcement/Equal Protection grounds. Id. On summary judgment, the district court 
dismissed all of the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, but did not dismiss the plaintiffs' 
selective enforcement claim. Id at 89-90. On appeal, an issue arose as to whether 
plaintiffs' entire First Amendment challenge was dismissed, or whether the selective 
enforcement claim created a separate "as applied" First Amendment challenge that 
remained before the district court. Id. at 91-92. 
7 
erroneous standard, because the district court mechanically adopted the City's partisan 
findings verbatim. [Compare Opening Br. at 44-47 with Appellee Br. at 32-36.] The 
City's silence on this issue essentially concedes the clearly erroneous standard should not 
apply and underscores that there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record on which to 
oppose Mr. Orvis's argument. 
Indeed, the uncontroverted record in this cases demonstrates that the district court 
mechanically adopted the City's partisan findings verbatim. The district court gave no 
reasoning for its ruling, gave no guidance relative to the City's preparation of the 
findings, and signed the City's findings without first hearing Mr. Orvis's objections or 
reviewing his written objections. [R. 501, pgs. 346-48, 350; R. 389; R. 396-415.] The 
district court simply adopted the City's partisan findings verbatim, many of which are 
legally insufficient, contrary to the record and, at times, plainly contradicted by the City's 
own admissions. [R. 128; R. 374-76; R. 388-95; Opening Br. at 27-34.] 
When a district court merely rubberstamps wholesale the partisan findings 
proffered by a litigant, the findings are less likely to reflect an impartial deliberative 
process and thereby do not warrant the heightened deference of the clearly erroneous 
standard. [Opening Br. at 45-46.] Because the district court here afforded the findings it 
signed no personal attention whatsoever, this Court should apply a less deferential 
standard of review. 
The findings, moreover, do not disclose the steps by which the district court 
8 
reached its decision. The law in Utah is clear that this Court only grants substantial 
deference to a district court's findings of fact when the findings "disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." State v. Genovest 871 
P.2d 547, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).10 The purpose of this 
rule is to allow an appellate court to effectively and meaningfully review the evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's decision. 14 at 550; Woodward v. Fazzio, 832 P.2d 474, 477-79 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The City wrongly asserts that the findings do disclose the steps by which the 
district court reached its decision. The City essentially argues the district court disclosed 
how it reached its decision by way of the introductory statement to the findings of fact, 
which provides: 
The above entitled matter came before the court on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and Defendant's Motion to Suppress.... The Court, having heard 
the testimony of witnesses, having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law[.] 
[Appellee Br. at 32 (quoting R. 395).] The City's reliance on this standard introductory 
recitation misses the mark because it only describes fue procedural steps taken by the 
district court, not the district court's analytical steps. 
The Genovesi case in fact demonstrates that a district court's mere recitation of its 
1QGenovesi is overruled on other grounds by State v. Bisnen 2001 UT 79, ^  47, 27 
P.3d 1073. 
9 
procedural steps, as in this case, does not satisfy the requirement that the analytical steps 
be disclosed. 871 P.2d at 550 (holding district court's findings insufficient, despite 
district court's statement in its findings that the court heard testimony and considered the 
arguments of counsel). The standard introductory recitation here does not disclose the 
district court's analytical steps, based on the evidence, through which the district court 
reached its decision on each factual issue, and, therefore, the findings are not sufficient to 
withstand challenge to the district court's legal conclusions. 
The district court failed to make specific subsidiary factual findings bearing on the 
issue of whether the City selectively enforced the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis. [Opening 
Br. at 47-48.] Those subsidiary findings were necessary to disclose the steps by which 
the district court decided to deny Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss. The City's argument -
that such findings would have been irrelevant because the district court, by implication, 
found no disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis - is without merit. If, by way of implication, a 
district court's ultimate decision rendered subsidiary factual findings irrelevant, there 
would be no need for factual findings at all. This, of course, is not the case.11 
uIt is not clear why the City makes a point of devoting over two pages to the 
findings which the City claims are admitted. Even assuming arguendo all the findings are 
admitted, which they are not, they still would not support the district court's ultimate 
conclusion because they fail to set forth the subsidiary facts necessary to support its 
decision. Nevertheless, to the extent the City claims findings 2, 5, and 6 are admitted, 
such a claim is simply not true. [Opening Br. at 29-33, 34 n.19, 39-41.] Likewise, 
findings 7-16 are not admitted by Mr. Orvis; rather, they are admitted by Officer Taufer, 
an agent of the City. 
10 
IIL THIS CASE SQUARELY PRESENTS A CLAIM FOR SELECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT, SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IS A DEFENSE TO 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED 
THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD. 
Contrary to the City's mantra, this case involves selective enforcement, not 
selective prosecution. The wrongful conduct at issue is the City officials' decision to 
enforce (and the manner in which they enforced) the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis. It is 
not the prosecutor's exercise of his discretion to criminally prosecute Mr. Orvis. The City 
officials' unconstitutional selective enforcement of the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis 
occurred well before this case ever came across the prosecutor's desk. 
While subtle, the distinction between selective enforcement and prosecution is 
important: 
Although courts sometimes use the terms selective prosecution and 
selective enforcement interchangeably, they are fundamentally different. 
Selective prosecution is a challenge to the prosecutor's decision whether 
and how to charge the defendant. Selective enforcement is a challenge to 
the actions of other state officers in determining against whom to enforce 
the laws. 
United States v. Garcia, No. CRIM. A. 99-64-1 MMS., 2000 WL 654377, *12 n.9 (D. 
Del. Feb. 28, 2000) (a copy of this opinion is attached as Exhibit B). By definition, Mr. 
Orvis's defense is for selective enforcement, not selective prosecution, because he 
challenges the decision and actions of the City officials, not the exercise of discretion by 
the prosecutor. United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (D. Kan. 
2004). 
11 
The City misses the substantive distinction between a defense of selective 
enforcement and a defense of selective prosecution. In general, to demonstrate the 
challenged conduct is unconstitutional under ordinary equal protection standards, the 
defendant must prove the conduct (1) had a discriminatory effect, and (2) was motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). To 
determine whether there was a discriminatory purpose, the law differs depending on 
whether the claim is for selective enforcement or prosecution. 
To prove discriminatory purpose for a selective enforcement claim, the defendant 
must demonstrate only that the city officials' decision to enforce the law was either (a) 
irrational and wholly arbitrary, or (b) based on animosity or ill-will toward the 
individual.12 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Boone v. 
Spurgess, 385 F.3d 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2004). In stark contrast, to prove discriminatory 
purpose for a selective prosecution claim, the defendant must demonstrate the 
prosecutor's decision to prosecute was "based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
12The City is wrong in its assertion that Mr. Orvis 'does not provide any 
substantive analysis of his claim under the Utah Constitution, nor urge a different result 
under the Utah Constitution." [Appellee Br. at 21.] Mr. Orvis expressly cited and 
applied Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution to the facts of this case. [Opening 
Br. at 24, 25 n.16, 26 n.17, 35-36 n.20, 43 n.22.] Mr. Orvis primarily addressed Federal 
law in the text of his opening brief simply for purposes of clarity and continuity, and 
because there is a dearth of Utah law which addresses the issue before the Court. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Orvis did expressly assert that, even if the Court applied the Federal 
standards relied on by the City, the Court should reach a different result under Utah's 
uniform operation of laws provision. [IdL at 35-36 n.20, 43 n.22.] 
12 
religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Armstrong. 517 U.S. at 464 (citation 
omitted).13 
In this case, Mr. Orvis's defense is for selective enforcement, not selective 
prosecution. Consequently, the City's argument that selective prosecution has not been 
established is irrelevant, the authorities on which the City relies are inapposite, and, 
notwithstanding the requirements of selective prosecution, Mr. Orvis''s prima facie 
showing of selective enforcement in the district court warrants reversal. Mr. Orvis was 
required to prove only that the selective treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary or 
based on animosity or ill-will toward the individual. He was not, contrary to the City's 
position, required to prove he was treated differently based on race, religion, etc. 
The City is also wrong that selective enforcement is not a defense to a criminal 
prosecution and is limited to civil actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That argument is 
pure jawbone and is not supported by citation to even a single authority. On the other 
hand, well-reasoned authority has squarely held that selective enforcement is a defense to 
a criminal prosecution. For example, in Jones v. Sterling. 110 P.3d 1271 (Ariz. 2005), the 
central issue on appeal was "whether petitioners' selective enforcement claims could 
13To prove the challenged conduct had a discriminatory effect, the test is 
essentially the same for both selective enforcement and prosecution: for selective 
enforcement, the defendant must demonstrate that similarly-situated individuals could 
have been, but were not, arrested or referred for prosecution; for selective prosecution, 
the defendant must show that similarly situated individuals could have been, but were not, 
prosecuted. Duque-Nava. 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 n.15. 
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constitute a 'defense' to the pending criminal charges." Id at 1273. The State contended 
"that proof of selective enforcement... is not a defense to a criminal charge, but rather 
entitles injured parties only to civil redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 1274. 
The Arizona Supreme Court soundly rejected that argument: 
[T]he fact that a § 1983 claim is an available remedy for selective 
enforcement does not make it the exclusive remedy. No case cited by the 
State so holds, and we are aware of none. . . . [A] long line of precedent 
establishes that proof of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment through 
selective enforcement or selective prosecution can be offered by a 
defendant in defense of criminal charges. 
Although the selective enforcement claim in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886)] was somewhat different than the one here, the case squarely 
stands for the proposition that violation of the Equal Protection Clause by 
authorities enforcing a facially neutral law can result in dismissal of 
resulting criminal charges. 
The State is thus incorrect in asserting that a § 1983 claim is the sole 
remedy for selective enforcement. 
14 at 1274-76. 
Indeed, several courts have recognized that selective enforcement of a criminal law 
is a defense to a criminal prosecution, even when based on a rational basis analysis, and, 
when proven, requires dismissal of the criminal information. See e.g.. People v. Eng'rs 
Country Club, Inc.. No. 01-03, 2003 WL 21537412, at **4-5 (N.Y. Just. Ct. June 23, 
2003) (recognizing "class of one" selective enforcement as defense to criminal 
prosecution, recognizing that such defense may be predicated on a showing that there was 
no rational basis for the discriminatory treatment, but finding a rational basis for 
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application of the ordinance at issue to the defendant) (a copy of this opinion is attached 
as Exhibit C); Cyprus v. Diskin, 936 F. Supp. 259, 263-64 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (noting that 
claims of selective enforcement "are most often raised as defenses to a criminal 
prosecution" and stating the claimant can succeed in such cases by demonstrating the 
state official "had no rational basis whatsoever for" the selective enforcement). 
In sum, the City's attempt to pigeon hole Mr. Orvis's defense as selective 
prosecution is incorrect. The relevant case law squarely supports a defense of selective 
enforcement, the standards for demonstrating selective enforcement are different from 
those which are used for selective prosecution, and the facts of this case establish the City 
selectively enforced the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis in denial of his constitutional right 
to equal protection of the law. 
IV. THE CITY SELECTIVELY ENFORCED ITS ORDINANCE AGAINST MR, 
ORVIS IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL 
PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
A* The City Intentionally Treated Mr. Orvis Differently than Others Who 
Were Similarly Situated. 
As demonstrated in Mr. Orvis's opening brief, the City intentionally treated Mr. 
Orvis differently than the 35 people with whom he was similarly situated. [Opening Br. 
at 26-34.] The City's arguments to the contrary accentuate the merit of Mr. Orvis's 
position. 
1. The City's first argument - that others similarly situated were prosecuted -
is not accurate and misrepresents the record. Citing to R. 322-44, the City asserts that 
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"[bjetween 1999 and 2003, the City . . . initiated at least twenty-four criminal 
prosecutions against individuals for operating businesses within the city without a 
license."14 [Appellee Br. at 7; see id at 24-25.] R. 322-44 is Exhibit E to the City's 
supplemental memorandum on the "selective enforcement issue." [R. 345; R. 379.] 
Exhibit E contains 23 enforcement actions, 18 criminal citations and 5 criminal 
informations, all ranging in date from May 11, 2002 to February 25, 2004. [R. 322-44.] 
As demonstrated by Exhibit E, the City did not issue a criminal citation for 
operating a business without a licence, except to Mr. Orvis, until May 2002. [Id.] This 
was approximately 6 months after Mr. Orvis's November 21, 2001 criminal citation, [R. 
5], and only after Mr. Orvis asserted the City was not "treat[ing him] fairly like everybody 
else."15 [R. 79.] For the City to state it began criminally citing people under the 
Ordinance in 1999 is a flagrant misrepresentation of the record. 
Moreover, not one of the 23 people who received criminal citations after May 
2002 were among the 35 people with whom Mr. Orvis was similarly situated; in fact, not 
14The City also misquotes Mr. Orvis*s brief when it claims Mr. Orvis has made a 
fatal admission to the above assertion. The full quote, which is partially quoted by the 
City on page 24 of its brief, states: "Apparently, as a result of the selective 
enforcement allegations raised by Mr. Orvis in this case and his civil case, the City 
began actively citing and prosecuting individuals for doing business without a license in 
or about May 2002. None of the people who were subsequently cited and prosecuted 
were on the list of 300." [Opening Br. at 15 n.14.] The bolded portions show those 
portions which the City conveniently left out of its quote. 
15Further, the City did not cite a Pleasant Grove resident for operating a business 
without a license until December 27, 2002, more than one year after the City cited Mr. 
Orvis. [R. 322-44.] 
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one of the 23 were even on the list of 300.16 [R. 500, pgs. 67, 73; R. 292-309; R. 322-44.] 
Thus, the City's subsequent criminal citations are wholly irrelevant to the issue before the 
Court.17 This is not a situation where Mr. Orvis was the first of many to be prosecuted, 
[Appellee Br. at 24 n.8]; rather, it is a situation where Mr. Orvis was the only person to be 
prosecuted when compared with those who were similarly situated. 
2. The City's second argument - that Mr. Orvis is not similarly situated to any 
group of people - is contrary to the law and the record. The City argues that "the facts 
which were analyzed . . . by the City enforcing officials, presented a situation dissimilar 
to anyone else." [Appellee Br. at 25.] The City bases this argument on the following 
"facts:" (1) Mr. Orvis allegedly "submitted a falsified and/or incorrect business licence 
application;"18 (2) "Mr. Orvis declined to allow the City to inspect his business;" and, 
arguably, (3) Mr. Orvis's violation of the Ordinance had allegedly "been longstanding 
16Only five of the 24 were even residents of Pleasant Grove. [R. 330-33, 338.] 
The rest of the 24 were either residents of other cities in Utah, such as Alpine [R. 325], 
Draper [R. 324], Murray [R. 323, 326], Orem [R. 340, 344], Sandy [R. 336], South Jordan 
[R. 327], Taylorsville [R. 329, 335], Tooele [R. 328], West Jordan [R. 322], and West 
Valley [R. 334], or residents of other states, such as Florida [R. 342], Kansas, [R. 341], 
Missouri [R. 339], Tennessee [R. 343], and Texas [R. 337]. This further demonstrates 
that the 23 are not similarly situated to Mr. Orvis. 
1
 furthermore, the record indicates the 23 were cited for door-to-door sales rather 
than for actually operating a business without a license. [See R. 500, p. 68; R. 344 
(citation for "selling without license) (emphasis added); R. 326 (same); R. 325 (same).] 
18Mr. Orvis has never admitted he misrepresented his business on his application to 
the City. To the contrary, Mr. Orvis testified, and the record demonstrates, that Mr. Orvis 
did not know whether Design Fabricators was a major or minor home occupation at the 
time he filed his application. [R. 354-58; R. 500, pgs. 87-89, 112-13.] 
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and flagrant." [14 at 25-26, 29.] 
By relying on these facts, the City assumes, without legal citation, that the law 
requires absolute identity, rather than similarity, of situations. What's more, the City 
assumes, without record citation, that the City actually considered these purportedly 
distinguishing facts when it made its enforcement decision. Based on the applicable law 
and the record in this case, both assumptions are wrong. 
First, the law does not require absolute identity of factual circumstances; rather, it 
only requires the defendant to demonstrate he was treated differently than those similarly 
situated. Fedorov v. United States. 600 A.2d 370, 379-81 (D.C. 1991); see also 
Barrington Cove Ltd. P^ship v. Rhode Island Housing Corp.. 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) 
("Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary."). Similarity, moreover, only requires 
the factual circumstances to be similar in relevant aspects. Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 
8. 
The Fedorov case illustrates that a rule such as the one proposed by the City is 
underinclusive and contrary to the law. In Fedorov, the defendants were arrested and 
prosecuted for unlawful entry for refusing to leave a subway station during a political 
demonstration. Each defendant, as a first-time offender, was eligible for, but was denied, 
admission to the United States Attorney's pretrial diversion program. The defendants 
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filed motions to dismiss based on selective prosecution,19 arguing they were denied 
admission because of their status as political demonstrators. The trial courts denied the 
defendants' motions. Federov, 600 A.2d at 372-73. 
On appeal, the court was squarely confronted with the issue of the proper control 
group for purposes of the similarly situated test. Below, the government argued, and both 
trial judges agreed, "that the appropriate comparison group for selective prosecution 
analysis was all persons who had participated the same night in the demonstration on 
behalf of the homeless at the same place." WL at 380. The appellate court flatly rejected 
that conclusion, holding that such a classification was "fatally underinclusive." IcL In so 
holding, the appellate court explained that the government's analysis, "in effect, 
eliminated all room for comparison by considering as the control group only those 
persons whose constitutionally significant behavior was the same as that of appellants." 
Id. Concluding that the government's analysis "would inevitably defeat any meaningful 
comparison for selective prosecution purposes," the appellate court held "that prima 
facie, i.e., presumptively, all persons charged with violating a particular statute (who are 
first-time offenders without other pending charges) are 'similarly situated' for selective 
prosecution/diversion analysis."20 IdL 
19Although Fedorov involves selective prosecution, the principles underlying the 
"similarly situated" test apply with equal force to selective enforcement. See supra, note 
13. 
20Although the Federov court stated it was "not prepared to hold that this must be 
the appropriate comparison group in all cases," the court emphasized that for "'similarly 
19 
The City, like the government in Fedorov. is attempting to eliminate all room for 
meaningful comparison. Contrary to the City's assertion, the relevant control group was 
not required to have submitted a falsified and/or incorrect business license application, 
declined an inspection, or had "longstanding and flagrant" violations of the Ordinance. It 
is undisputed that Mr. Orvis was not criminally cited or prosecuted based on any of those 
alleged facts. Those facts, therefore, are not relevant aspects of the crime for which Mr. 
Orvis was cited and prosecuted.21 
Mr. Orvis was criminally cited and prosecuted for violating the Ordinance. All 
individuals who were similarly violating the Ordinance as of the City's August 3, 2001 
deadline constitute the relevant control group. Fedorov, 600 A.2d at 379 (agreeing that 
"the unlawful conduct defined by the elements of the crime itself comprises the defining 
criterion"). That group, as demonstrated by the record, is comprised of the 35 people, 
including Mr. Orvis, who were on the Tax list, were on the list of 300, did not file an 
application by the City's deadline, and continued to do business without a license. 
situated' analysis, the only possible basis for subgrouping violators of a particular 
criminal statute or provision is some kind of legally definable line." Id at 380-81 & n.16. 
21The City's reliance on Geaneas v. Willets. 715 F. Supp. 334, 340 (M. D. Fla. 
1989), for the proposition that a "longstanding and flagrant" violation of an ordinance is a 
relevant consideration in demonstrating the dissimilarity of situations, is entirely 
misplaced. The Geaneas court did not even address that factor in the context of whether 
the plaintiffs were treated differently than those similarly situated. In fact, the court 
found the plaintiffs "set forth evidence sufficient to meet the first prong of the selective 
enforcement test," Le., that the plaintiffs were treated differently than those similarly 
situated. Id. 
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Because Mr. Orvis was the only one out of the 35 who was criminally cited and 
prosecuted, Mr. Orvis was treated differently than those similarly situated. 
Second, the City's argument that it actually relied on facts which allegedly 
differentiated Mr. Orvis from anyone else is contrary to the record. There is not a single 
piece of evidence in the record - none - that gives rise to an inference the City considered 
these purportedly differentiating facts when the City decided to enforce the Ordinance 
against Mr. Orvis. Instead, the only evidence in the record relative to what facts the City 
considered for its enforcement decision demonstrates the City only considered its 
animosity toward Mr. Orvis for the political stance he took on city-wide development 
while sitting on the Planning Commission. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277; R. 311-12; R. 500, 
pg. 91.] This, of course, is not a proper consideration in determining against whom to 
enforce an ordinance. Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire. 394 F.3d 836, 849 (10th Cir. 
2005); Esmail v. Macrane. 53 F.3d 176, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1995). 
B. The City's Selective Treatment of Mr. Orvis was Irrational and Wholly 
Arbitrary and was Based on the City's Animosity Toward Mr. Orvis. 
As demonstrated in Mr. Orvis's opening brief, the City's selective enforcement 
was irrational and wholly arbitrary and based on the City's animosity and ill-will toward 
Mr. Orvis. [Opening Br. at 34-44.] Indeed, there was no legitimate rational basis for 
treating Mr. Orvis differently than those with whom he was similarly situated. Moreover, 
the record demonstrates the City's selective treatment was motivated by City officials' 
animosity and political spite toward Mr. Orvis. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277; R. 311-12; R. 
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500,pg.9L] 
The City wholly fails to address either of these bases for Mr. Orvis's defense of 
selective enforcement. Rather, relying on selective prosecution standards, the City simply 
hangs its hat on the argument that Mr. Orvis was required but failed to prove the City's 
selective treatment of Mr. Orvis was based on race, religion or the desire to prevent 
exercise of constitutional rights. The City does not rebut the City's lack of a rational 
basis or its animosity and its political spite toward Mr. Orvis. As a result, the only 
conclusion this Court can reach, based on the record, is that the City's selective treatment 
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
Try as the City might to distance itself from the standards applicable to the defense 
of selective enforcement, the fact remains, as the United States Supreme Court has held, 
that an individual's constitutional equal protection rights are violated if a city's selective 
treatment was either (a) irrational and wholly arbitrary, or (b) based on animosity or ill-
will toward the individual. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; see also Boone, 385 F.3d at 932 
(holding that, after Olech, selective enforcement may be based on either a bad faith 
motive or arbitrariness). Courts applying the second-prong of that test have held that 
evidence demonstrating the selective treatment was motivated by local officials' 
animosity or political spite toward the individual is sufficient. Mimics, 394 F.3d at 849; 
Esmail 53 F.3d at 179-80. It matters not that these cases arose in a civil context under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Jones, 110 P.3d at 1274-76. The standards remain the same for both civil 
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plaintiffs and criminal defendants. See e^ , Cyprus, 936 F. Supp. at 263-64 (applying 
same rational basis standard set forth in Olech); Engineers Country Club, 2003 WL 
21537412 at *4 (same). 
Mr. Orvis has established a prima facie case of selective enforcement based on 
both the irrationality of the City's selective treatment and the fact the City's treatment was 
motivated by animosity and political spite toward Mr. Orvis. The City has entirely failed 
to rebut Mr. Orvis's prima facie case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons in Mr. Orvis's opening and reply briefs, this Court should reverse 
the district court's denial of Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss, reverse Mr. Orvis's conviction 
and dismiss this case. 
DATED: April J , 2006. 
TOMSIC & PECK 
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Pleasant Grove City, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Victor R." Orvis, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20050343-CA 
Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court on Pleasant Grove City's 
motion for summary disposition. Pleasant Grove City alleges that 
this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the 
case originated in justice court and was then appealed to the 
district court. However, Utah Code section 78-5-120(7} states 
that the decision of a district court may be appealed when "the 
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002); see also State v. 
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Orvis's 
docketing statement indicates that he is appealing the 
constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to him. Thus, this 
court has jurisdiction to resolve that issue only. See id. at 
277. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pleasant Grove City's motion for 
summary disposition is denied. 
IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that Orvis's request for costs and 
attorney's fees is denied. 
DATED this 2!"day of December, 2005 
FOR THE COURT: 
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PLEASANT GROVE UT 84062 
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United States District Court, D. Delaware. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Segundo GARCIA, Defendant. 
No. CRIM. A. 99-64-1 MMS. 
Feb. 28, 2000. 
Keith M. Rosen, Assistant United States Attorney, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
plaintiff. 
Christopher S. Kovste. Assistant Federal Public 
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
SCHWARTZ. Senior J. 
I. Introduction 
*1 On September 14, 1999, the Grand Jury for the 
District of Delaware returned a two-count indictment 
against the defendant, Segundo Garcia ("Garcia"). 
Count One charges Garcia with the knowing and 
intentional possession with intent to distribute five or 
more kilograms of a mixture containing cocaine, in 
violation of21U.S.C.$S 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). 
Count Two charges Garcia with conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1). 841(b)(1)(B). and 846. Docket 
Item ("D.I.") 11. Garcia pled not guilty to both counts 
and filed this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) to suppress physical 
evidence seized from his vehicle and statements made 
following his arrest. Garcia has also requested that the 
Court allow him to take additional discovery to support 
his motion. 
For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny 
Garcia's request to take additional discovery. The Court 
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will enter an order suppressing Garcia's statements 
concerning his country of origin and that he did not 
have any immigration paperwork or an alien card. The 
Court will deny his motion to suppress as to all other 
evidence. 
II. Findings of Fact 
At the evidentiary hearing, the Government called 
Delaware State Police Lieutenant Albert Homiak and 
Delaware State Police Sergeant Patrick Ogden. The 
defendant called Delaware State Police Corporal David 
Szafranski. The defendant did not testify. The court 
makes the following essential findings of fact as 
required by Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
At about 6:15 p.m. on August 25,1999, Lt. Homiak, an 
eighteen year veteran of the Delaware State Police, and 
Cpl. Szafranski were on patrol in a police cruiser on 
southbound U.S. Interstate 95 in New Castle County, 
Delaware. As Lt. Homiak drove the cruiser and 
approached the toll plaza near the Maryland state line, 
the officers observed a green Dodge Intrepid stopped 
on the roadway near the entrance of one of the toll 
booths labeled "E-Z Pass Only." They then observed 
the Intrepid begin to back up even though other vehicles 
were approaching from behind. The Intrepid then 
stopped and quickly changed one lane to the left 
without signaling. At that time, the officers were 
sufficiently far away that they were unable determine 
the state in which the car was licensed. 
The officers concluded that the movements of the 
Intrepid were unsafe and could have contributed to an 
accident. They also concluded that the driver had 
violated Delaware state traffic laws prohibiting 
inattentive driving and changing lanes without a signal. 
Lt. Homiak followed the Intrepid from behind as it 
entered the toll plaza. While the Intrepid was in the 
plaza, Lt. Homiak drove the police cruiser to another 
toll lane to the left of the one being used by the 
Intrepid. Neither officer was able to see the Intrepid or 
its occupants while it was in the toll plaza. The Intrepid 
pulled out first and then Lt. Homiak followed the 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Intrepid from behind and activated the patrol car 
emergency equipment. The Intrepid pulled over onto 
the right shoulder. At this point, the officers observed 
that the car contained two occupants but had not seen 
them from the front or side, and therefore, could not 
determine the gender, race, or any other physical 
characteristics of the occupants. 
*2 Lt. Homiak approached the car from the driver's 
side while Cpl. Szafranski approached from the 
passenger's side. They observed a driver, later identified 
as defendant Segundo Garcia, and one passenger, later 
identified as Abel Noya ("Noya"). Lt. Homiak asked 
Garcia for his license and registration. Garcia produced 
his license from his pants pocket and a car rental 
agreement from the glove box. When Garcia handed the 
documents to Lt. Homiak, his hand was shaking. 
Lt. Homiak then asked Garcia to exit the car and 
proceed to the rear of the car between the Intrepid and 
the police cruiser. Lt. Homiak testified that he made this 
request because his standing between the Intrepid and 
the interstate traffic created a personal safety concern 
and because it would be easier to converse away from 
the road noise. Lt. Homiak testified that it is habit to ask 
all drivers to exit their cars during a traffic stop. Cpl. 
Szafranski testified that, on that day and on prior 
occasions he worked with Lt. Homiak, Lt. Homiak 
asked about 30% of all drivers to exit their cars. He also 
testified that the primary reasons for asking a driver out 
of the car are concerns for officer safety and road noise. 
Garcia complied with Lt. Homiak's request. Once 
Garcia was outside the car, Lt. Homiak informed him 
that he had been stopped because of the 
above-mentioned traffic violations. Garcia responded 
that he was not paying attention when he approached 
the toll because he was looking down to count money 
and ended up in the "E-Z Pass Only" lane. Garcia 
agreed that he backed up and changed lanes without 
signaling. Lt. Homiak noted that Garcia spoke with an 
accent, but could understand English and answered all 
questions spontaneously. Lt. Homiak concluded that 
there was no language barrier. During this conversation, 
Lt. Homiak noticed that Garcia seemed nervous and 
repeatedly glanced back over his shoulder towards the 
Intrepid and looked down at the ground. 
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Lt. Homiak examined the rental agreement and noticed 
that the car had been rented to Robert Carter in Key 
West, Florida four days earlier. He also noticed that 
Garcia was listed as a secondary driver on the car. Lt. 
Homiak then asked who had rented the car. Garcia 
responded that it was a "friend." Lt. Homiak asked if 
the "friend" was the passenger. Garcia said "no." Lt. 
Homiak then asked for the name of the person who had 
rented the car. Lt. Homiak observed a nervous and 
frightened look on Garcia's face and he appeared more 
nervous than he had originally appeared. Garcia asked 
him to repeat the question and Lt. Homiak did. Garcia 
responded that a friend had rented the car but he did not 
know the friend's name. Garcia also stated that the 
renter lived in Key West but he did not know the 
address. 
At this point, Lt. Homiak asked Garcia from where he 
was traveling. Garcia responded that they were coming 
from Boston, where they had gone to visit Garcia's 
ex-wife. He stated that they had stayed there for one 
day. Lt. Homiak noticed Garcia licking his lips and 
observed that he appeared increasingly more nervous. 
Lt. Homiak believed he was more nervous than the 
average person in a traffic stop. Lt. Homiak then asked 
his destination and he stated that they were headed back 
to Florida. Lt. Homiak also asked him the name of his 
passenger. Garcia stated that he was a friend from 
Florida but that he only knew him as "Slim." 
*3 Lt. Homiak then asked him what country he was 
from. Garcia stated he was from Cuba and that he was 
not a U.S. citizen. Lt. Homiak asked if he had any 
paperwork or an alien card and Garcia stated that he did 
not. 
Next, Lt. Homiak approached the passenger, who was 
still seated in the car. The passenger identified himself 
as Abel Noya. Lt. Homiak asked if he had any 
identification and he said he did not. Lt. Homiak then 
asked from where he was traveling. Noya replied 
"Baltimore." Lt. Homiak explained that they were 
actually headed toward Baltimore. Noya repeated that 
they were coming from Baltimore. He then said he 
meant Boston. Noya then correctly identified the 
defendant as Garcia. Noya stated that he and Garcia had 
stayed in Boston for three days and had gone to see a 
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friend of Garcia's. Lt. Homiak asked Noya who had 
rented the car and Noya responded that he did not 
know. Noya told Lt. Homiak that he was from Cuba, 
was not a U.S. citizen, and did not have any paperwork 
or an alien card. 
At this point Lt. Homiak was suspicious that criminal 
activity may be afoot. Based upon his suspicion, Lt. 
Homiak asked Garcia to sit in the back of the police car 
and Garcia complied. Garcia was not restrained at this 
point but he could not open the doors from the inside. 
Lt. Homiak sat in the front seat of the police cruiser and 
asked Garcia if he would consent to a search of the 
Intrepid. Garcia said he would allow the search. Garcia 
appeared to be coherent and to not have any trouble 
understanding Lt. Homiak. 
Lt. Homiak then asked Garcia if he could read English 
or Spanish better. Garcia stated he could read both but 
that he was better at Spanish. Lt. Homiak handed 
Garcia his license and rental agreement. Next, Lt. 
Homiak gave Garcia a standard Delaware State Police 
consent-to-search form, written in Spanish. Lt. Homiak 
told Garcia that the form was a consent to search form 
and not a traffic ticket. As he handed over the form, Lt. 
Homiak informed Garcia that he had the right to refuse 
consent. Garcia looked the form over for about forty 
seconds before signing the form. Garcia never indicated 
that he had any trouble reading or understanding the 
form. Lt. Homiak never made any promises or threats 
to induce his consent. 
Next, Lt. Homiak asked him what, if anything, in the 
car belonged to him. Garcia replied that he had some 
clothes and shoes in the trunk, but that the bag in the 
trunk belonged to Noya. Lt. Homiak and Cpl. 
Szafranski asked Noya to exit the car. Lt. Homiak 
informed Noya that Garcia had consented to a search of 
the vehicle and asked him if he had any objection. Noya 
shook his head from side to side and said no. Lt. 
Homiak asked Noya, what, if anything, in the car 
belonged to him. Noya replied that he owned a brown 
overnight bag in the trunk. Lt. Homiak asked Noya if 
they could search the bag. Noya nodded his head and 
said "yeah." 
Lt. Homiak and Cpl. Szafranski searched the Intrepid. 
They noticed an odor of air freshener in the front seat 
and found a can of spray air freshener under the seat 
where Noya had been seated. The officers found no 
contraband in the passenger compartment. They opened 
the trunk and discovered loose clothing, a pair of shoes, 
and a brown overnight bag. Cpl. Szafranski unzipped 
the bag, looked through the contents, and removed a 
plastic wrapped package, which appeared to contain a 
white powdery substance, that Lt. Homiak believed to 
be a narcotic. The package was later field tested by Sgt. 
Ogden testing positive for the presence of cocaine. 
*4 Lt. Homiak removed Garcia from the police cruiser 
and placed him in handcuffs. He told Garcia he was 
under arrest and advised Garcia of his Miranda [FN11 
rights from a card. Lt. Homiak asked Garcia if he 
understood his rights and Garcia stated that he did. Lt. 
Homiak then approached Noya. About five minutes 
later, Lt. Homiak returned to the police car where 
Garcia was seated. Lt. Homiak asked Garcia if he 
wanted to talk about what was going on. Garcia 
indicated that if he said anything, someone would kill 
his family. He also expressed concern for his elderly 
father and mentally ill brother. Lt. Homiak asked Garcia 
if the drugs in the car were a payment for transporting 
a larger load of drugs to Boston. Garcia stated that Lt. 
Homiak was close to being correct. 
FN1. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966). 
Garcia was then transported to Delaware State Police 
Troop 9 in Odessa, Delaware. In the Captain's office, 
Garcia was interviewed by Lt. Homiak, Sgt. Ogden, and 
DEA Special Agent Eric Miller. Garcia was seated in a 
chair across the desk from the officers and was not 
restrained in any way. Lt. Homiak reminded Garcia of 
his Miranda rights, explained those rights were still in 
effect, and said that they wished to ask him some 
questions. Garcia stated he understood those rights and 
that he wanted to cooperate. He was coherent and had 
no trouble speaking English. No threats or promises 
were made to induce him to talk. He did not appear to 
be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
During the ensuing conversation, Garcia made the 
following statements: 
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. He was on parole for smuggling 30,000 pounds of 
marijuana into the U.S. and that this arrest would 
make him a career criminal; 
. He was just the driver in this incident; 
. He had driven to Boston with his neighbor Slim; 
. Slim lived across the street from him in Key West; 
. He and Slim transported the cocaine found in the 
Intrepid to Boston; 
. They were hoping to get a higher price for the drugs 
in Boston than they could in Key West; 
. They were taking the cocaine back to Florida 
because they could not get the higher price. 
After Garcia made these statements, all questioning 
ceased. 
III. Discussion 
In his motion to suppress, Garcia raises five distinct 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges. First, Garcia 
challenges the validity of the stop of his automobile. 
Second, Garcia contends that asking him to exit his car 
was not constitutionally permissible. Third, Garcia 
asserts the roadside questioning of Garcia and the 
detention of Garcia in the patrol car violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Fourth, Garcia argues that he did not 
voluntarily consent to the search of the Dodge Intrepid. 
Fifth, Garcia contends that his statements were not 
made pursuant to a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. 
In addition, Garcia asserts that all of the evidence 
should be suppressed because the police violated his 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection and Privileges and Immunities clauses. 
Lastly, Garcia requests permission to take additional 
discovery, including a subpoena of police records, to 
support his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges. 
A. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Challenges 
1. Validity of Traffic Stop 
*5 Garcia contends the stop of the Dodge Intrepid was 
an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits law 
enforcement officials to stop an automobile if the 
official has probable cause to believe that the vehicle or 
driver has violated a traffic law. See Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806. 810 (1996); United States v. 
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Moorfield 111 F.3d 10. 12 (3d Cir.1997). The Court 
credits the testimony of Lt. Homiak and Cpl. Szafranski 
and finds that the Dodge Intrepid stopped in front of the 
toll plaza, drove in reverse against oncoming traffic, 
and suddenly changed lanes without signaling. These 
events would give an objective officer probable cause 
to believe that the Intrepid violated 21 Del.Code§4155 
(prohibiting changing lanes without signaling) and 21 
Del.Code § 4176 (prohibiting careless or inattentive 
driving). 
2. Ordering Garcia to Exit Car 
Garcia argues that Lt. Homiak's ordering him out of the 
car after receiving his driver's license and rental 
agreement was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. 
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Supreme Court 
established a bright line rule that officers may lawfully 
order any driver to step out of the vehicle during a 
traffic stop. See 434 U.S. 106. 109-11 (1977): 
Moorefield, 111 F.3d at 12. The Court established this 
rule after concluding that "legitimate and weighty" 
concerns for officer safety outweighed the de minimus 
intrusion of asking a driver to exit the automobile. See 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11. The Court credits Lt. 
Homiak s testimony that he asked Garcia out of the car 
because he feared for his own safety standing between 
the car and oncoming traffic and because of traffic 
noise. It follows, ordering Garcia out of the car did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
3. Roadside Questioning of Garcia and Continued 
Detention in Patrol Car 
While Garcia was standing on the side of the road next 
to the car, Lt. Homiak asked him the following 
questions, in order: 
1. Who rented the car? 
2. Is the renter the passenger of the car? 
3. What is the name of the friend that rented the car? 
4. Where did you travel from? 
5. How long were you there? 
6. What was the purpose of your trip? 
7. What is your destination? 
8. What is the name of the passenger? 
9. What country are you from? 
10. Do you have any paperwork [FN21 or an alien 
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card? 
FN2. By paperwork, the Court surmises Lt. 
Homiak meant immigration paperwork. 
After receiving Garcia's answers, observing Garcia's 
demeanor, and obtaining contradictory statements from 
Noya, Lt. Homiak moved Garcia from the roadside to 
the backseat of the patrol car. While in the patrol car, 
Lt. Homiak obtained Garcia's verbal and written 
consent to search the automobile. Defendants contend 
that these questions and the movement of Garcia violate 
the Fourth Amendment because they exceed the scope 
of detention and questioning allowed during a traffic 
stop. TFN31 
FN3. It is not clear from defendant's motion 
whether he challenges the admissibility of his 
statements made during this time period as 
being in violation of his Miranda rights. The 
motion seeks suppression of statements that 
were obtained because he "did not receive 
effective advisement of his Miranda rights 
and/or that he did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive those rights as he 
understood them." D.I. 28 at f 18. However, 
because Garcia has not briefed this argument, 
he is deemed to have waived it. 
Nonetheless, a suspect's Miranda rights do not 
attach unless the suspect is in custody and 
subject to interrogation. See United States v. 
Leese. 176 F.3d 740. 743 (3d Cir.1999). 
During a traffic stop and a Terry stop, a 
suspect is not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda. See Berkemer 468 U.S. at 440; 
United States v. Elias. 832 F.2d 24, 26 (3d 
Cir.1987). As discussed in the text, infra, the 
Court finds that the initial three questions 
occurred during a routine traffic stop. The 
Court also finds that all of the subsequent 
questions up to and including Lt. Homiak's 
request for consent to search constituted a 
Terry stop. Accordingly, the defendant was 
not entitled to receive Miranda warnings 
during this questioning and none of his 
statements were obtained in violation of 
Miranda. 
A police officer may only lawfully detain an individual 
for a traffic violation for the period necessary to 
completely investigate the traffic violation. See Florida 
v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491. 500 (1983) ("an investigative 
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"); United 
States v. Johnson. 63 F.3d 242. 247 (3d Cir.1995); 
Karnes v. Skrutsla. 62 F.3d 485. 491 (3d Cir.1995) 
(civil case). During a traffic stop, the officer must limit 
his questioning to matters directly related to the traffic 
stop. See Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420. 439 
(1984); Karnes. 62 F.3d at 494. If, however, during 
questioning related to the routine traffic stop, the officer 
identifies articuable facts that create reasonable 
suspicion of additional criminal activity, the officer may 
continue to detain the driver and investigate the facts 
giving rise to the additional suspicion. See Berkemer, 
468 U.S. at 439 (citing Tern v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.29 
(1968)); Johnson, 63 F.3d at 247. Whether a reasonable 
and articuable suspicion exists turns on an objective 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances. See 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1. 8 (1989). The 
officer may ask "a moderate number of questions ... to 
try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the 
officer's suspicions." See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. 
*6 The Government urges the Court to adopt rulings of 
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which held the scope of 
a traffic stop investigation reasonably includes asking 
for the license and registration, asking the driver about 
car ownership, destination, and purpose of the trip, and 
asking the driver to sit in the patrol car. See United 
States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160. 1163 (8th Cir.1994); 
United States v. Castillo, 76 F.3d 1114. 1117-18 (10th 
Cir.1996). Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
has cited Ramos for another proposition, it has not 
expressly adopted this bright line rule regarding the 
scope of permissible detention and questioning during 
a traffic stop. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 247. On the facts 
of this case, the Court finds it unnecessary to adopt this 
bright line rule because Lt. Homiak's initial actions 
were directly related to the traffic stop and his later 
actions were in response to a reasonable suspicion 
raised by Garcia's and Noya's responses. 
Lt. Homiak's first three questions, regarding the name 
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of the primary renter of the car and whether the renter 
was the passenger, were directly related to the reason 
for the traffic stop. Garcia was stopped, in part, for 
inattentive driving. Because the car was rented, it was 
reasonable for Lt. Homiak to ascertain whether the 
passenger was the primary renter who may be able to 
take over driving. The Court also credits Lt. Homiak's 
testimony that it is common police practice to ascertain 
the identity of the driver and owner of an automobile 
during any traffic stop, in order to ensure a car is not 
stolen. In short, these three questions related directly to 
investigating the traffic stop. 
Based on Garcia's answers and demeanor in response 
to the first three questions, it was reasonable for Lt. 
Homiak to have suspicion that additional criminal 
activity, such as an automobile theft or drug transport, 
may be afoot. See United States v. Hernandez, 872 
F.Supp. 1288,1293 (D.Del. 1994) (reasonable suspicion 
of drug smuggling aroused by smell of air freshener, 
inability to answer routine questions such as name and 
address of company, nervousness, and avoiding eye 
contact). Garcia responded to Lt. Homiak's first three 
questions by stating that a "friend" had rented the car, 
that the passenger was not that friend, and that he did 
not know the name of the renter. Garcia also repeated 
several of the questions before responding and paused 
before answering. When answering Garcia appeared 
nervous and frightened, even more so than he initially 
appeared. He also repeatedly glanced back over his 
shoulder towards the Intrepid and looked down at the 
ground. A reasonable police officer could conclude that 
these facts together raise a reasonable suspicion of 
additional criminal activity, such as automobile theft or 
drug smuggling. Given the totality of these 
circumstances, Lt. Homiak was entitled to ask a 
"moderate number of questions" to attempt to confirm 
or deny his reasonable suspicion. See Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 439. 
*7 Lt. Homiak's next five questions, regarding the city 
from which Garcia was traveling, the length of his trip, 
the purpose of the trip, his destination, and the name of 
his passenger constituted a moderate number of 
questions used to confirm or refute Lt. Homiak's 
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. 
These questions all relate to confirming or dispelling 
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any suspicion that the car was stolen or that Garcia was 
involved with drug smuggling. Therefore, these five 
questions were within the scope of those permitted by 
the Fourth Amendment. 
However, Lt. Homiak's subsequent two questions 
concerning Garcia's country of origin and whether he 
had an alien card were beyond the scope of permissible 
questioning. The record reveals no reason for asking 
these questions. Although one could dream up possible 
reasons, the Court concludes that these questions were 
not reasonably designed to confirm or refute any 
suspicion of automobile theft or drug smuggling. 
Moreover, prior to asking these questions, Lt. Homiak 
had observed nothing to raise a reasonable suspicion 
that Garcia may be an illegal alien. Finding no 
justification for these two questions, it necessarily 
follows these questions were in violation of Garcia's 
Fourth Amendment rights. His responses to them will 
be suppressed. 
Garcia's answers to the two questions regarding his 
alien status do not taint Lt. Homiak's next step of asking 
Garcia to sit in the patrol car and obtaining consent to 
search. As a general rule, all evidence derived from a 
Fourth Amendment violation must be suppressed as a 
fruit of the poisonous tree. See Costello v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961): United States v. 
Herrold 962 F.2d 113 U 139 (3d Cir. 1992). However, 
subsequent evidence is not a fruit of the poisonous tree 
if it was discovered based on an independent source. 
See id. In this case, Garcia's answers to the first three 
questions, his answers to the next five questions, his 
demeanor, and Lt. Homiak's subsequent interview of 
Noya, together provide an independent basis to support 
asking Garcia to sit in the patrol car and requesting 
consent to search. Disregarding the responses to the two 
questions regarding alienage, this heightened detention 
was supported by reasonable articuable suspicion, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, that crime 
may be afoot. See Hernandez, 872 F.Supp. at 1295 
(citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491. 493-95). 
In a closely analogous case, the defendant was moved 
from the roadway to the patrol car during a traffic stop. 
See United States v. Davis. 1995 WL 702530. at *6 
(D.Del. 1995). In Davis, the defendant was driving a 
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rented car, did not know the name of the primary renter, 
did not know the name of his passenger, whom he could 
only identify as "Have," failed to make eye contact, and 
appeared unusually nervous. See id. at *2. In addition, 
the passenger did not know where they were going and 
did not know about the rental car. See id. This Court 
ultimately upheld the search of the car obtained while 
the defendant was seated in the patrol car. See id. 
*8 Similarly, the totality of the circumstances observed 
by Lt. Homiak reasonably supported his additional 
suspicion of criminal activity. First, the primary renter 
of the car was not present and neither Garcia nor Noya 
knew his name. Second, Garcia knew his passenger 
only as "Slim" and did not know his real name. Third, 
there were several inconsistencies between Garcia's and 
Noya's stories about their trip. Garcia said he was 
returning from Boston to Florida after visiting his 
ex-wife for one day. In contrast, Noya told Lt. Homiak 
that they were traveling from Baltimore. After Lt. 
Homiak explained that they were headed towards 
Baltimore, Noya stated that they had been in Boston for 
three days visiting a friend of Garcia's and were headed 
back to Florida. Finally, Garcia was acting 
progressively and unusually more nervous as the stop 
continued. His hand was shaking, he repeatedly looked 
over his shoulder and at the ground, he licked his lips, 
and he appeared progressively more nervous, 
frightened, and in despair. While it is true that any one 
of these facts, taken alone, would not necessarily create 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the Court 
finds that in this case, viewing the totality of the 
circumstances, these facts could create in an objective 
law enforcement officer a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, 
Lt. Homiak did not violate the Fourth Amendment by 
moving Garcia into the backseat of the patrol car for 
further investigation. 
4. Voluntariness of Consent to Search 
Next, Garcia challenges the search of the car as being 
based on involuntary consent. fFN41 The Government 
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
consent is voluntary, considering the totality of the 
circumstances. See United States v. Velasquez, 885 
F.2d 1076. 1081 (3dCir.l989) (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218. 222 (1973)). A 
non-inclusive list of factors to evaluate are age, 
education, whether defendant is told of right to refuse 
consent, length of detention, repeated and prolonged 
nature of questioning, and any physical punishment for 
refusal to consent. See id. 
FN4. Garcia consented to a search of the car 
but disclaimed any ownership of the bag in the 
car in which the contraband was located. Noya 
verbally consented to the search of the bag. 
However, the Court does not rule on the 
validity of Noya's consent because Garcia has 
no standing to challenge the search of a bag to 
which he disclaimed all ownership. SeeRakas 
v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128. 134 (1978). 
Accordingly, even if Garcia's consent is 
invalid, he still has no standing to challenge 
the admissibility of the contraband found in 
the bag. 
Garcia relies heavily on Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983). essentially arguing that forcing Garcia to sit in 
the back of a locked patrol car created a coercive 
atmosphere. In that case, the defendant was taken from 
the airport concourse and placed in a small room with 
two police officers who suspected drug smuggling. See 
id. at 502. The officers held on to his tickets and 
identification while asking for his consent. See id. The 
officers did not give any indication that he could leave 
for his airplane. See id. Finally, the officers informed 
him that they had retrieved his luggage from the 
airlines. See id. The Supreme Court held that the 
consent to search his luggage was involuntary. See id. 
However, in Hernandez, this Court distinguished Royer 
and found consent to be voluntary in a case with facts 
analogous to those in this case: 
*9 Aviola's request for the defendant to sit in the 
patrol car does not evoke the coercive atmosphere 
found in Royer and the other cases cited by 
defendant. First, the encounter occurred along a 
public highway, during the daytime. United States v. 
Velasquez. 885 F.2d 1076. 1082 (3d Cir.1989). cert, 
denied, 494 U.S. 1017. 110 S.Ct. 1321. 108L.Ed.2d 
497(1990). Second, Aviola returned the defendant's 
driver's license, vehicle registration, and resident 
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alien card prior to obtaining the defendant's written 
consent to search. This is important because the 
defendant, at that time, regained control of the 
documents required to leave the scene if he so 
desired. See e.g., Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. at 504, 
103 S.Ct. at 1328. Third, Aviola explained to the 
defendant that he could refuse to consent to the 
search. This is also important because, while the 
Fourth Amendment does not require Aviola to notify 
defendant of his right to refuse, defendant's 
knowledge of his right to refuse ranks positively in 
the balance of facts that may countermand a finding 
of unlawful detention and government coercion. Cf. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S 
.Ct.2041. 2047-2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 
Finally, the Court finds no evidence of threats or 
coercion by Aviola in asking the defendant to enter 
the patrol car or to give his consent once inside. 
Aviola did not unholster his weapon and apparently 
took pains to insure that the defendant understood his 
right to refuse to consent. 
* * * 
The circumstances of Aviola's and defendant's 
interaction during the stop establish that Hernandez 
could understand English. Defendant replied to 
Aviola's questions in English, including a statement 
in English to the effect of "[s]ure, go ahead and 
search my car." From these statements, the Court also 
concludes that the defendant understood Aviola's 
instruction that the defendant could refuse to consent. 
Further, to ensure defendant's understanding, Aviola 
provided a Spanish language consent to search form, 
which the defendant appeared to read before he 
signed it. The defendant never indicated that he did 
not or could not understand that he was consenting to 
a search.... Finally, the Court finds no evidence that 
Aviola would have detained the defendant further if 
he did refuse to consent to the search. Cf. Florida v. 
Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 503, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1327,75 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 
The Court further finds that Aviola did not apply any 
physical duress or coercion to induce defendant's 
consent. No evidence suggests that Aviola subjected 
the defendant to repeated or prolonged questioning. 
The Court also finds that, if anything, Aviola's return 
of the defendant's drivers license, vehicle registration, 
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and resident alien card lessened any adverse 
psychological impact of asking defendant to sit in the 
patrol car. Cf Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. at 504, 103 
S.Ct. at 1328 ("by returning his ticket and driver's 
license, and informing him that he was free to go if he 
so desired, the officers may have obviated any claim 
that the encounter was anything but a consensual 
matter from start to finish"). In sum, under the totality 
of the circumstances, the Court finds that the 
defendant voluntarily consented to the request to 
search his vehicle. 
*10 Hernandez. 872 F.Supp. at 1295-97. 
Likewise, even though Garcia was placed in the 
backseat of a locked patrol car, the totality of the 
circumstances did not evoke a coercive atmosphere. 
First, the encounter occurred during the daytime. Also, 
Garcia initially gave verbal consent in English. Then, 
Lt. Homiak returned the license and rental agreement to 
Garcia before asking him to read and sign the written 
consent form, which militates against sitting in the back 
of the patrol car. In addition, Lt. Homiak informed 
Garcia that he had the right to refuse to consent. [FN 51 
Lt. Homiak offered Garcia a consent form in either 
Spanish and English. Garcia chose the Spanish form 
and appeared to take some time reading the form before 
signing it. He never indicated he did not understand 
what he was reading or signing. Also, the Court finds 
no evidence of physical or mental intimidation by Lt. 
Homiak. The Court also finds no evidence that Lt. 
Homiak would not have terminated the encounter had 
Garcia refused consent. Garcia responded 
spontaneously to all verbal communications and did not 
appear to have any trouble understanding what was 
being said. Finally, Garcia was age 51 at the time of the 
stop and had extensive prior experience with the 
criminal justice system. Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court concludes that Garcia's 
consent was voluntary. 
FN5. The defendant argues that the acts of 
returning the license and rental agreement and 
telling Garcia he had the right to refuse 
consent are not relevant to the analysis 
because they occurred after he had already 
given verbal consent in English. However, this 
argument was rejected by this Court's decision 
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in Hernandez where the officer performed the 
same acts after obtaining verbal consent but 
before requesting written consent. See id. at 
1291. Moreover, the fact that Lt. Homiak 
asked for consent twice in two different 
languages, once verbal and once written, is 
indicative of voluntariness. 
5. Post-Arrest Waiver of Miranda Rights 
Next, Garcia challenges the admissibility of his 
post-arrest statements as being in violation of his 
Miranda rights. In his motion, Garcia argues that "he 
did not receive effective advisement of his Miranda 
rights and/or that he did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive those rights as he understood 
them." D.I. 28 at % 18. However, Garcia has failed to 
brief this argument. Therefore, he is deemed to have 
waived this challenge. 
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the challenge has 
no merit. The defendant made statements at two points 
following his arrest. First, he made a statement 
regarding payment for transport of drugs to Boston in 
response to a question by Lt. Homiak while sitting in 
the back of the patrol car after being arrested. Second, 
he made several statements at Troop 9 while being 
questioned by Lt. Homiak, Sgt. Ogden, and Agent 
Miller. There is no dispute that, at both times, Garcia 
was subject to custody and interrogation, thus triggering 
his Miranda rights. See Leese, 176 F.3d at 743. 
First, Garcia received effective advisement of his 
Miranda rights before he made any statement. In the 
police cruiser, Lt. Homiak read Garcia his rights from 
a card. Lt. Homiak asked him if he understood those 
rights and Garcia said that he did. Later, at Troop 9, 
before interviewing Garcia, Lt. Homiak reminded 
Garcia of his Miranda rights and stated that they were 
still in effect. Garcia indicated that he understood those 
rights. There is no evidence in the record that Garcia 
was unable to understand the rights as they were read to 
him. At all times he appeared to have a clear 
understanding of the English language. He never 
indicated that he did not comprehend what was being 
said. The Court concludes he received effective advice 
of his rights. 
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*11 Second, Garcia made a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights when he made 
his statements. See Moran v.. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
421 (1986); United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 156 
(3dCir.l998). First, Garcia only spoke after the officers 
asked him if he wished to speak and Garcia informed 
the officers that he did. Second, Garcia gave no 
indication that he did not understand the rights or the 
fact that he was waiving them. Third, Garcia was 51 
years old and had extensive experience with the 
criminal justice system. Fourth, Garcia appeared to be 
coherent and did not have any trouble communicating. 
Fifth, Garcia was not physically restrained, beyond 
being handcuffed while in the patrol car, at any time 
during the questioning. Sixth, Garcia never attempted to 
invoke any of his Miranda rights. Finally, the defendant 
does not assert, and the Court does not find, evidence of 
ill-treatment or threats by any officer. Thus, the Court 
finds that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, 
Garcia's motion to suppress his statements on the above 
named grounds will be denied. 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
1. Equal Protection Clause 
Garcia requests that the Court suppress all evidence 
obtained against him because of selective enforcement 
of the law, based on his race, ethnicity, or national 
origin,JTN6J and by burdening his fundamental right to 
travel, in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. TFN71 Specifically, Garcia 
alleges that Lt. Homiak ordered Garcia to exit his car 
and subjected him to more intense questioning based on 
his race and/or because he was from Florida. TFN81 
Garcia asserts, that at the very least, he is entitled to 
additional discovery of Lt. Homiak's traffic stop records 
to determine whether there is a pattern of Lt. Homiak 
using constitutionally forbidden factors, "such as race, 
sex, nationality or culture, skin color, or state of 
residence" in deciding whether to order drivers out of 
their cars during traffic stops. See D.I. 35 at 16. The 
Court holds that Garcia has not made any showing to 
warrant discovery or to prove that Garcia's Equal 
Protection rights were violated. 
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FN6. Garcia is of Hispanic descent. To be 
more concise, the term "race" will be used to 
refer generally to race, ethnicity, or national 
origin. 
FN7. The Equal Protection Clause provides 
that: "No state shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." 
FN8. At the suppression hearing, Garcia 
appeared to frame his Equal Protection 
argument as challenging the decision to stop 
Garcia's car. However, after being unable to 
adduce any evidence that either officer knew 
Garcia's or Noya's race or state of origin at the 
time of the traffic stop, Garcia has recast his 
claims in terms of the decision to ask Garcia 
out of his car. 
The police procedure challenged in this case—ordering 
the suspect to exit the car during a traffic stop-is a 
"facially neutral" policy because it does not expressly 
involve a racial (or other suspect) classification or a 
classification based upon state of origin. See Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977); United 
States v. Pern. 788 F.2d 100. 116 (3d Cir.1986). 
However, the Equal Protection Clause "prohibits 
selective enforcement" of a facially neutral policy based 
on a suspect's race or his state of origin. See Whren, 517 
U.S. at 813 (1996). In order to prove selective 
enforcement of the law, Garcia must show that he was 
ordered out of his car based upon a discriminatory 
purpose. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 373 
(1886): Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263; Stehnev v. 
Pern. 101 F.3d 925.938 (3d Cir.1996). In order to find 
discriminatory intent, the Court may consider evidence 
of disparate impact, such as a statistical pattern of 
ordering suspects of one race out of cars during traffic 
stops. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
*12 The Government urges the Court to follow the lead 
of several other courts and apply the United States v. 
Armstrong. 517 U.S. 456 (1996), test for allowance of 
discovery from a selective prosecution case to this 
selective enforcement case. [FN9] See United States v. 
Page 10 
Nwarro-Camacho. 186 F.3d 701. 711 (6th Cir.1999): 
United States v. Bell. 86 F.3d 820. 823 (8th Cir.1996): 
United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896. 899 (4th 
Cir.1996); United States v. Garcia. 1999 WL 318363. 
at *2 (D.Kan. 1999); Chavez v. Illinois. 27 F.Supp.2d 
1053, 1066 (N.D.IU. 1998) (civil case). In Armstrong, 
the Supreme Court set a high threshold for obtaining 
discovery in a selective prosecution case. See 
Armstrong. 517 U.S. at 465. The defendant must prove 
that: (1) similarly situated suspects of a different race 
violated the law and were not prosecuted; and (2) the 
prosecutor's decision to prosecute was based at least 
partially upon race. See id. The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has not decided whether to adopt this test for 
selective enforcement cases. 
FN9. Although courts sometimes use the terms 
selective prosecution and selective 
enforcement interchangeably, they are 
fundamentally different. Selective prosecution 
is a challenge to the prosecutor's decision 
whether and how to charge the defendant. 
Selective enforcement is a challenge to the 
actions of other state officers in determining 
against whom to enforce the laws. 
However, this Court need not reach the issue of 
employing Armstrong or formulating a separate 
standard for a selective enforcement case because, in 
this case, Garcia has made absolutely no showing of 
either discriminatory intent or effect so as to warrant 
discovery. Garcia's sole basis for asserting 
discrimination is an inconsistency between Lt. Homiak's 
andCpl Szafraksi's testimony. Lt. Homiak testified that 
it was his habit to ask every stopped driver to exit the 
car. In contrast, Cpl. Szafraksi testified that, on every 
day he worked with Lt. Homiak, Lt. Homiak asked only 
about 30% of the drivers to exit the car. Garcia argues 
that this discrepancy shows that Lt. Homiak does not 
ask every driver to exit his car, that he uses a 
"conscious though [sic] process" to determine whom to 
ask oul of his car, and that he is "hiding the real 
motivation(s) as to why he asks certain drivers to exit 
their cars." D.I. 41 at 16. 
However, this discrepancy alone provides no proof of, 
nor does it raise any suspicion of, discriminatory intent 
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or effect by Lt. Homiak. No testimony was developed 
to demonstrate that the drivers asked out of their cars on 
that day, or on any other day, were predominantly of a 
particular race or state of origin. Moreover, both Lt. 
Homiak and Cpl. Szafraksi articulated several 
race-neutral reasons for deciding when to ask drivers to 
exit their cars, including officer safety, traffic noise, or 
suspicious license, vehicle, or insurance information. 
Lt. Homiak also testified that he asked Garcia to exit his 
car for officer safety, due to his standing between the 
car and interstate highway, and because of traffic noise, 
which made oral communication difficult. The record 
contains no evidence that race or state of origin was 
ever a factor in asking Garcia, or any other driver, to 
exit his car. Therefore, the record does not raise any 
suspicion that Lt. Homiak has a pattern of deciding 
whom to ask out of the car based on race or state of 
origin, so as to allow discovery into his practices. 
*13 Because the record contains not a shred of 
evidence to even raise suspicion sufficient to support 
Garcia's claim of racial or state of origin discrimination, 
the Court will deny Garcia's request for discovery and 
deny his motion to suppress the evidence on these 
grounds. 
2. Privileges and Immunities Clause 
In addition, Garcia seeks to have the evidence 
suppressed because of violations of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
TFN101 No case has been cited and the Court has 
located no case which indicates that a violation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause would be an 
appropriate basis for suppressing evidence in a criminal 
case. Nonetheless, the Court need not reach this issue 
because there has been no showing that this clause was 
even violated. 
FN 10. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "No 
state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States." 
The Privileges and Immunities clause prevents a State 
from discriminating against citizens of another state in 
favor of citizens of its own. See Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire v. Piper. 470 U.S. 274. 277 (1985); 
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 190, n. 9 (3d 
Cir.1998). As discussed above, the record contains no 
evidence, and raises no suspicion, that Lt. Homiak 
discriminated against Garcia, or any other driver, based 
on his state of origin. Therefore, on this ground, 
Garcia's request for discovery and motion to suppress 
evidence will be denied. 
IV. Conclusion 
Based on the facts adduced from the suppression 
hearing and for the reasons given above, the Court will: 
(1) deny Garcia's request to take additional discovery; 
(2) enter an order suppressing Garcia's statements 
concerning his country of origin and that he did not 
have any immigration paperwork or an alien card; and 
(3) deny Garcia's motion to suppress as to all other 
evidence. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 654377 (D.Del.) 
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Justice Court, Village of Roslyn Harbor, 
County of Nassau. 
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, 
v. 
The ENGINEERS COUNTRY CLUB, INC., 
Defendant. 
No. 01-03. 
June 23, 2003. 
In a prosecution of a country club for violating an 
ordinance precluding the playing of outdoor music or 
the use of an outdoor public address system, the Justice 
Court, Village of Roslyn Harbor, County of Nassau, 
David H. Pfeffer, J., held that the ordinance did not 
violate the club's free speech or Equal Protection rights. 
Ordered accordingly. 
West Headnotes 
iU Constitutional Law €=>90.1(1) 
92k90.1(n Most Cited Cases 
HI Zoning and Planning 0=>76 
414k76 Most Cited Cases 
Content-neutral zoning ordinance precluding the 
playing of outdoor music or the use of an outdoor 
public address system did not violate country club's 
First Amendment free speech rights, despite lack of any 
decibel limitation or unreasonable noise prohibition; the 
ordinance applied to a substantial government interest, 
i.e. protecting the tranquility of residents in their homes, 
and given the undisputed and substantially unimpeded 
right of the club to play live or amplified music indoors, 
an alternative avenue of communication was provided. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. 
121 Constitutional Law €=>228.2 
92k228.2 Most Cited Cases 
[21 Zoning and Planning 0=^76 
414k76 Most Cited Cases 
Content-neutral zoning ordinance precluding the 
playing of outdoor music or the use of an outdoor 
public address system did not violate country club's 
Equal Protection rights; there was a rational basis for 
establishing specific regulations on noise likely to occur 
as a result of the catering and other activities of the 
club. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. 
Karl C. Seman, Esq., counsel for defendant. 
Michael A. Montesano, Village Prosecutor. 
JUDGMENT%h 
DAVID H. PFEFFER, Village Justice. 
*1 The defendant, a local country club, stands accused 
of violating a local law precluding the playing of 
outdoor music or the use of an outdoor public address 
system. 
When the matter came onto the calendar for trial on 
May 19, 2003, the defendant, appearing through 
counsel, sought leave to file a motion dismissing the 
Information because of alleged unconstitutionality of 
the Village ordinance and/or because the Information 
was allegedly defective, the motion not yet having been 
served and filed, and no earlier motion to stay having 
been made. 
The defendant's plea of not guilty in lieu of formal 
arraignment was served on March 11, 2003. The case 
was set for trial to begin on April 14, 2003. That trial 
date was then adjourned at defendant's request to May 
19,2003. Thus, the motion to dismiss was sought to be 
filed more than 45 days after the plea in lieu of 
arraignment. Under CPL § 255.20(3), this Court was 
free to summarily deny the motion. Nevertheless, the 
Court, in the interest of justice, decided to proceed with 
the trial on the merits, and entertain the motion, insofar 
as it related to alleged unconstitutionality of the Village 
ordinance, subject to permitting the People an 
opportunity to respond to the motion within about four 
weeks. While the motion also asserted a request for 
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dismissal because of an alleged defective information, 
no basis for relief was set forth and the supporting 
papers merely asked for dismissal for alleged 
unconstitutionality. 
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss 
the information is denied and the defendant is found 
guilty of violating the Village ordinance as charged. 
The Village Ordinance Involved 
The defendant is charged with violating Roslyn Harbor 
Village Zoning Code Section 6-1.3 subsection a., item 
v. 
Section 6-1.3 is entitled "Supplemental regulations for 
use in residential districts" subsection a, of which Item 
v is a part, is entitled "Private recreational clubs and 
outdoor recreational uses" and sets forth an overall 
scheme for the protection of surrounding residents. Item 
i of subsection a. requires interior areas of such clubs to 
be sufficiently sound insulated or separated from 
adjacent residential structures so as to avoid "noise 
nuisance." Item ii requires that the appearance of any 
structure not be out of character or scale with the 
neighborhood. Item iii requires suitable screening or 
buffering adjacent to residential use areas. Item iv 
restricts intensive outdoor activity and restricts the 
location of outdoor service facilities. Items viii, ix and 
x restrict the location of swimming pools, equipment 
and parking with regard to surrounding residences. Item 
xii restricts outdoor lighting so as not to impinge on 
residential property. At issue here is Item v which 
provides "No outdoor music or public address system 
shall be provided." In context, the word "outdoor" was 
intended to apply to both "music" and "public address 
system." No prohibition of Item v applies to indoor 
activities. 
Tlte Nature of Defendant and its Accused Activity 
*2 The defendant is a private country club located 
within a residential district and surrounded entirely by 
private residences. The defendant is expressly accused 
of violating the provision of the zoning ordinance by 
having an activity conducted outdoors with a live band 
on July 14, 2002. In the course of questioning by the 
Court, the defendant has indicated a desire and 
intention to continue a practice of providing outdoor 
music including associated amplification. 
The Nature of Defendant's Constitutional 
Challenge 
Defendant contends that the Village zoning law 
provision violates the "Freedom of Speech" provision 
of the U.S. Constitution, i.e. the First Amendment. At 
the same time, defendant in its paper concedes that the 
restriction of the zoning ordinance is "content-neutral." 
In addition, defendant asserts first that defendant is 
denied "due process of law" and then asserts that the 
ordinance "is a denial of equal protection under the law 
and therefore unconstitutional." To the extent it can be 
understood, defendant's equal protection/due process 
argument is based upon the fact that the outdoor live 
music, outdoor amplification ban applies only to private 
recreational clubs within residential districts of which 
defendant is the only one, and not to other private 
residents living in their homes surrounding the 
defendant club. 
The Legal Criteria Used to Decide First Amendment 
Challenges to Statutes 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
established the criteria to be used in considering a First 
Amendment challenge to a statute. In U.S. v. O'Brien, 
391 U.S. 367. 376. 88 S.Ct. 1673. 20 L.Ed.2d 672 
(1968), Ihe Supreme Court stated: "when speech and 
non-speech elements are combined in the same course 
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288. 293. 104 S.Ct. 3065. 82 L.Ed.2d221 (1984). 
the Supreme Court stated: "Expression, whether oral or 
written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have 
often noled that restrictions of this kind are valid 
provided they are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
targeted to serve a significant government interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information." The Supreme Court 
has also noted that local governments have "a 
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from 
unwelcome noise." City Council of Los Angeles v. 
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Tavpavers for Vincent 466 U.S. 789, 806, 104 S.Ct. 
2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). See also, Care\< v. 
Brown. 447 U.S. 455.471, 100 S.Ct. 2286.65 L.Ed.2d 
263 (1980) where the Court said the government's 
interest in "protecting the well-being, tranquility, and 
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in 
a free and civilized society." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also 
described the right of residential privacy, i.e. the right 
of a citizen in his home to be free from the intrusion of 
unwanted speech, and the important governmental 
interest in protecting against such intrusion. See Frisbv 
v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474. 484- 5. 108 S.Ct. 2495. 101 
L.Ed.2d 420 (1988): 
*3 One important aspect of residential privacy is 
protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many 
locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid 
speech they do not want to hear, the home is different 
... special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy 
within their own walls, which the State may legislate 
to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we 
have repeatedly held that individuals are not required 
to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes 
and that the government may protect this freedom. 
See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87, 69 
S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), where the Court said 
that "the unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who 
may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be 
made to take it. In his home or on the street he is 
practically helpless to this interference with his privacy 
by loud speakers except through the protection of the 
municipality." 
There is no requirement, as long as the ordinance is 
content-neutral, for a court to second guess the 
municipality in determining whether the scheme 
selected constitutes the least intrusive or least restrictive 
means available for effectuating the governmental 
interest. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 798. 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). 
Application of the Constitutional Standard to this 
Case 
ril We can assume music is a form of speech that is 
subject to First Amendment protection. See Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781. 790. 109 S.Ct. 
2746. 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). The ordinance at issue 
here does not restrict any specific content of the music. 
Indeed defendant admits the ordinance is 
content-neutral. (Seman Aff. % 28) 
Given the admittedly content-neutral nature of the 
ordinance involved, and its clear application to a 
substantial government interest, i.e. protecting the 
tranquility of residents in their homes, and given the 
undisputed and substantially unimpeded right rFNll of 
the defendant to play live or amplified music indoors, 
thereby providing an alternative avenue of 
communication, the ordinance is presumptively valid. 
See City ofRenton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41. 47. 106 S.Ct. 925. 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). 
FN1. The only restriction on indoor activities 
it that the areas be sufficiently sound-insulated 
or separated from adjacent residential 
structures. Village Ordinance § 6-1.3a.i. 
The defendant's primary challenge appears to be that 
some decibel limitation or unreasonable noise 
prohibition might have been more appropriate than an 
absolute ban on outdoor music or outdoor 
amplification. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has stated that there is no constitutional 
prohibition against a ban on amplification, provided 
there is a basis for such a ban. See Housing Works, Inc. 
v. Kerik. 283 F.3d 471. 481 (2d Cir.2002).There the 
Court explained that there are inherent problems 
associated with adjustment of sound volumes and 
monitoring that make an absolute ban more appropriate. 
See also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.. 512 U.S. 753. 
114 S.Ct. 2516. 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) [upholding 
ban against singing, chanting, etc. in vicinity of 
hospitals, even without a distinction between different 
levels of noise]. 
Particularly on point is Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.1990). 
There the Second Circuit held that the MTA's absolute 
ban on amplified music on a subway platform passed 
constitutional muster, even though the lower court 
thought that a less restrictive alternative could also 
eliminate the problem of offensive noise. Citing to 
Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit noted that 
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"[t]he validity of [time, place or manner] regulations 
does not turn on a judge's agreement with the 
responsible decision maker concerning the most 
appropriate method for promoting significant 
government interests." 903 F.2d at 918 (alterations in 
original)(interaal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
*4 With respect to alternative means for expression, 
the ordinance does not bar live music indoors, subject 
only to the requirement for adequate noise insulation. 
The defendant is free to perform live music, amplified 
or otherwise indoors. The fact that defendant prefers 
outdoor music is not relevant to constitutionality. As 
noted in Carew-Reid, "The First Amendment, however, 
does not guarantee appellees access to every or even the 
best channels or locations for their expression." 903 
F.2dat919. 
The need for the Village ordinance is clear from the 
testimony of Gerald Unger, a Village resident, whose 
property abuts that of the defendant club. Mr. Unger 
testified that because of the music being played at the 
club for 1 1/2 to 2 hours, music conceded by defendants 
to be live outdoor music, he and his guests were 
seriously disturbed at his home. 
The two cases relied on by defendant to support its 
view of unconstitutionality are inapposite. In People v. 
Edinger, the City Court of Long Beach struck down an 
absolute prohibition on the use of power blowers, such 
as leaf blowers, because the court concluded that there 
was no state of facts that could be reasonably assumed 
to support the ordinance as an enactment that promotes 
a legitimate government interest. 179Misc.2d 104,106, 
683 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Long Beach City Ct. 1998V In Kim 
v. City of New York, the court sustained a public 
preacher's challenge to an unnecessary noise ordinance 
because the court concluded that the ordinance's 
definition of unnecessary, which was defined to mean 
any sound that annoys a person, was both overbroad 
and vague. 774 F.Supp. 164. 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 199IV 
The Edinger case did not involve a First Amendment 
issues while the Kim case went off on the issue of 
whether the noise standard could be understood and 
enforced. 
This Court is satisfied that the clear legislative intent to 
protect residents in their homes surrounding defendant's 
property is a proper motivation for the outdoor music 
and amplification ban, a ban which is content-neutral. 
On the basis of the authorities discussed above, the 
challenge to constitutionality of the Village ordinance 
based upon First Amendment considerations is 
overruled. 
The Equal Protection Challenge 
[2] The Equal Protection clause requires states to treat 
all similarly situated people alike. City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Livinz Ctr.. 473 U.S. 432. 439. 105 S.Ct. 
3249. 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). An equal protection 
challenge to an economic or social regulation is subject 
to a rational basis review since a legislative enactment 
carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. This 
strong presumption of constitutionality can be 
overcome only by showing "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there was no rational basis for the adoption of the 
local law here at issue." Town of N. Hempstead v. 
Exxon Corp.. 53 N.Y.2d 747. 749. 439 N.Y.S.2d 342. 
421 N.E.2d 834 (1981V 
Equal protection claims brought by a "class of one" 
may be successful where this "class of one" "has been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly 
situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v. 
Oleck 528 U.S. 562.564. 120 S.Ct. 1073.145 L.Ed.2d 
1060 (2000) (per curium) (holding that a property 
owner stated an Equal Protection claim against a village 
which demanded a 3 3-foot easement in order to connect 
the property owner to the municipal water supply where 
the village demanded a 15-foot easement from other 
similarly situated property owners). Since Oleck the 
Second Circuit has stated that an equal protection claim 
could proceed to trial if either there was no rational 
basis for the discriminatory treatment received or the 
action complained of was motivated by animus. Harlen 
Assoc, v. Incorporated Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 
494. 5Q0(2dCir.2001) (holding that a zoning board's 
denial of a special use permit for a convenience store 
did not state an equal protection claim because of the 
Board's legitimate concern that the convenience store 
would encourage nearby school children to cross a busy 
intersection). 
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*5 Although the ordinance challenged here applies 
only to this defendant, the only private recreational club 
within the Village, absent a showing of animus or 
ill-will on the part of the Village, the equal protection 
question is whether the Village has a rational basis for 
discriminating against outdoor music and public 
address systems on the defendant's property. 
The nature of defendant's activities, by its own 
admission places it in a unique position in comparison 
to its surrounding residential neighbor. Private 
recreational clubs are the only entities permitted by the 
Village to engage on a regular basis in a residentially 
zoned area in the business of catering various affairs 
involving large groups of people and the playing of 
music, including weddings, showers, bar and bat 
mitzvahs, christenings, anniversaries, birthdays, mother 
and father day celebrations, golf and tennis outings, 
meetings, fund raisers, memorials, and concerts. Seman 
Aff. | f 11,13. Otherwise, the only other permitted uses 
in residentially zoned areas within the Village are single 
family detached dwellings, municipal uses, places of 
worship, schools, and outdoor recreational uses. None 
of the permitted uses, other than private recreational 
clubs, cater to such affairs on a regular basis. No other 
entities, other than private recreational clubs, have a 
desire or incentive to hold such affairs outdoors on a 
regular basis. 
Both cases cited by defendant in support of its 
argument are inapposite because such cases involved 
regulations discriminating on the basis of content. In 
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 498 U.S. 92 
(1972) and Carev v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 
2286. 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). the challenged 
regulations distinguished among different classes of 
speech on the basis of content. The challenged 
regulation in Mosley prohibited all forms of picketing 
near schools, except for peaceful labor picketing was 
held to be a content based distinction that violated the 
Equal Protection clause. The challenged regulation in 
Carey prohibited all forms of picketing of residences, 
except for the peaceful picketing of a place of 
employment. The court held that the distinction 
between the picketing of a place of employment and 
other forms of picketing was a content-based distinction 
that violated the Equal Protection clause. 
Here, the Court finds that there was a rational basis for 
establishing specific regulations on noise likely to occur 
as a result of the catering and other activities of the 
defendant club. No motive other than that has been 
established. No ill will or animus toward the defendant 
has even been suggested. As a result, the defendant has 
failed to sustain its burden of establishing invalidity on 
the basis of constitutional equal protection. 
The challenge to constitutionality of the Village 
ordinance based upon equal protection considerations 
is overruled. 
The motion to dismiss the Information is denied. 
Decision on the Merits 
*6 At the trial, the court heard the testimony of Mr. 
Unger referred to above. The Court also accepted as an 
admission of defendant, the statement in paragraph 19 
of the Attorney Affirmation by Karl C. Seman, 
defendant's counsel, as expressly verified by David 
Shaw, the defendant's General Manager and authorized 
corporate agent: 
"19. On July 14, 2002 the ECC [abbreviation used 
for defendant Engineers Country Club, Inc.] did 
sponsor its annual 4th of July celebration where the 
evening culminated with music performed outdoors 
by a live band." 
The defendant is therefore found guilty of violating 
Roslyn Harbor Zoning Ordinance § 6-1.3, subsection a., 
item v. The defendant is ordered to appear for 
sentencing on July 21, 2003 at 7:30 p.m. 
Not Reported in N.Y.S.2d, 2003 WL 21537412 
(N.Y.Just.Ct), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51069(U) 
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